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abstract After the 2017 pro-independence referendum took place in Catalonia, many 
municipalities changed the names of the streets to commemorate the event. In order to do 
so, in some cases the names related to the central state were removed, such as those related 
to the constitution or the king. By performing a frame analysis, this article explores how 
the majority nationalist parties, which identify themselves with the state, assessed this ini-
tiative made by the pro-independence local authorities. The paper thus offers new evidence 
to the existing literature on majority nationalism, a subject poorly studied in comparison 
with the total amount of research devoted to peripheral nationalism. On the basis of street 
naming as a nation-building tool, two are the main empirical contributions: firstly, the rep-
resentatives of majority nationalism defended the symbols linked to the state as neutral and 
representative of the whole citizenry, while those of the minority group were framed as 
partisan and deeply divisive. On the other hand, we stress the importance of the democratic 
transition and the 1978 constitution as relevant rhetoric resources of the national narrative 
in contemporary Spain.
keywords frame analysis; nationalism; nation-building; national identity.
1. Introduction
Since the outlawed Catalan secessionist referendum took place on 1 October 
2017, many municipalities have renamed their streets in order to commem-
orate that day. In this regard, it is known that a shared symbolisation of 
history serves political purposes and often takes the form of a legend.1 More 
specifically, the naming of streets is a political act that expresses power and 
Article received on 01/02/2019; approved on 03/05/2019.
1. Azaryahu and Kook, “Mapping the nation”; Gillis, Commemorations; Kertzer, Politics and 
symbols.
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authority2 and tries to make the successful version of history seem natural.3 
In the context of a region like Catalonia that forms part of a state where two 
nation-building projects are competing for the hearts and minds of the same 
citizens, this question is by no means a minor one. The spread of dozens of “1 
October” streets poses a threat to the official narrative of Spanish nationalism 
and provides scholars with an enticing opportunity to examine the behaviour 
of majority nationalism in this situation.
In this respect, despite the existence of a renowned academic tradition which 
emphasizes nation building through the state,4 as well as another focusing 
on the sociocultural characteristics of groups upon which states are built,5 it 
is only recently that scholars have focused on the identity and behaviour of 
the majority group in multinational polities.6 Very little attention has been 
paid to them compared with the abundance of studies about regionalist and 
secessionist movements of minority groups.7
In relation to those recent contributions, most authors have focused on state 
practices as representative of the hegemonic identity8 and the unconscious 
assumption of nationhood,9 but the response of majority nationalism in mul-
tinational contexts when its narrative is under threat has not yet received sus-
tained attention. However, this point is highly significant for the coexistence 
of different nation-building projects in the same territory.10 Furthermore, 
all human identities are narrated,11 and commemorative street names are in-
strumental in the symbolic construction of this identity.12 In this respect, the 
2. Palonen,” Reading Street Names Politically”.
3. Azaryahu, “The Power of Commemorative Street Names”.
4. Tilly, The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe.
5. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations.
6. Barak-Corren, “The Provocative Effect of Law”; Dieckhoff, Nationalism and the Multina-
tional State; Gagnon et al., Contemporary Majority Nationalism.
7. Alonso, Challenging the State; Guibernau, Nations Without States; Keating, Nations Against 
the State.
8. Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms?”; Dieckhoff, Nationalism and the Multi-
national State; Yack, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community.
9. Billing, Banal Nationalism; Fox and Miller-Idriss, “Everyday Nationhood”.
10. Norman, Negotiating Nationalism.
11. Castiñeira, “Imagined Nations”.
12. Azaryahu and Kook, “Mapping the Nation”.
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specific relationship between street naming and divergent nation-building 
projects in multinational polities has also been largely unexplored.
This paper aims to address this oversight by analysing the Catalan case in 
2017. After the secessionist referendum was held on 1 October, certain state 
political symbols were removed from the street names. Catalan nationalists 
argued that those symbols were used to oppress their people, while the pro-
state authorities supported the representativeness and even the neutrality of 
their own symbols with respect to all citizens. More particularly, I will con-
sider Girona and Sant Cugat del Vallès13 as pro-independence local councils 
that renamed urban spaces, previously known respectively as “Constitution 
Square” and “King’s Square”, as “1 October Square”.
The dispute between different national narratives is highly explicit here, as 
contemporary Spanish nationalism is deeply anchored in the 1978 Consti-
tution,14 and the monarchy has also played an important role in shaping the 
modern Spanish identity. Furthermore, the secessionist referendum is already 
well on the way to becoming a legend of contemporary Catalan nationalism. 
In this context, a heated debate between the representatives of minority and 
majority nationalisms was held, allowing us to make a deep analysis of how 
the latter reacted to the street name change.
The research is therefore driven by the following question: how was the renam-
ing of streets depicted by representatives of majority nationalism in the context of 
the 2017 Catalan secessionist referendum? New evidence in the field is provided 
by a frame analysis of speeches, media reports and minutes of the debate 
on street naming in Girona and Sant Cugat del Vallès. The research makes 
three original contributions. Firstly, it offers new empirical evidence to add 
to existing theories about majority nationalism. Secondly, it enhances our 
understanding regarding the contemporary Spanish nationalist discourse. Fi-
nally, it provides an in-depth account about a specific historical event, namely, 
the 2017 pro-independence referendum in Catalonia.
13. In subsection 4.1 I discuss the selection of these cities, but succinctly they are the only 
Catalan municipalities that have removed a state-based name (“constitution” and “king” 
squares, respectively) beyond the addition of a new label based on the 2017 referendum. 
This fact allows us to better analyse the behaviour of majority nationalism in a context of a 
heated cultural battle.
14. Lecours and Nootens, “Understanding Majority Nationalism”.
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The paper begins with some brief contextual remarks about the 2017 se-
cessionist referendum. It then develops the theoretical framework based on 
the existing literature about majority nationalism, street naming and the 
contemporary Spanish national project. After this, the methods and results 
are presented. Finally, the conclusions discuss the empirical findings and end 
the paper.
2. The Catalan secessionist referendum: a contextual 
account
In recent years, Catalonia has been going through a turbulent political peri-
od.15 After controversial negotiations on a new statute of autonomy, which 
was declared partly unconstitutional in 2010 by the judiciary, pro-independ-
ence feeling began to grow in this Spanish region. From an average of 15%-
20% of the population historically supporting secession, in November 2013 
this territorial preference reached its peak (48.5%), and since then it has 
barely fallen below a threshold of 40%.16 In a binary question, surveys usually 
show a virtually tied situation between the supporters of independence and 
the supporters of Spanish unity (see table 1).17 Several attempts at a negoti-
ated political solution to this challenge have failed, as has the proposal of a 
new fiscal agreement (2012) and a consultation about the political future of 
Catalonia (2014).
Table 1. Share of people who answer “yes” or “no” to the question “do you want Catalo-

























YES 44.5% 44.1% 42.9% 46.7% 46.6% 45.3% 47.7% 44.9% 45.3% 44.3% 41.1% 48.7%
NO 45.3% 48.0% 50.0% 47.8% 48.2% 45.5% 42.4% 45.1% 46.8% 48.5% 49.4% 43.6% 
Source: CEO, 2017.
In 2015, the secessionist parties achieved a majority in the Catalan parlia-
ment and began the unilateral phase of the so-called “Catalan process” for 
15. Cuadras, Catalonia: A new independent state in Europe?
16. CEO, Baròmetre d’Opinió Política 3a Onada 2018.
17. CEO, Baròmetre d’Opinió Política 3a Onada 2017.
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independence.18 The plan was to develop “state structures” and to declare 
independence in 18 months, but in the middle of the period they called a ref-
erendum as a way to enhance their legitimacy.19 However, the poll was quick-
ly outlawed by the courts. Despite this, the regional authorities continued to 
push to hold it and they organised the vote for 1 October 2017. The Spanish 
government tried to prevent the poll by force, sending in the police. The 
result was 1,066 people injured on the Catalan side,20 while 33 police officers 
were also hurt in the operation.21 This event opened the stormiest period in 
recent Spanish history, resulting in a failed declaration of independence and 
the subsequent imposition of direct rule from Madrid.
Memories of the referendum are thus deeply divisive in Catalan society. For 
a considerable number of citizens, it was an act of disobedience against the 
legitimate rule of law, while for others it was an event of resistance and 
popular self-organisation. In fact, members of the pro-independence civil 
society secretly kept and transported the ballot boxes to the polling sta-
tions. During the day, crowds of people stood in front of the polling stations, 
trying to impede the entry of the police. In the end, many people managed 
to vote and the Catalan government was even able to issue official results. 
Although numbers may be misleading due to the difficulties encountered 
during polling, the voter turnout was 43.03% of the electorate — over two 
million people — and 90% of the votes were cast for secession. The call to 
vote basically appealed to citizens committed to independence.
For them, the day was an epic event. While non-secessionists mainly consid-
ered the vote to be “shameful”, the Catalan nationalists stated that they felt 
“hope” but also “anger” due to the state repression.22 The event certainly had 
an impact on everyone. Since then, not only have street names been changed 
to commemorate the vote, but books, media reports and even documentaries 
have been launched about it. Nationalist politicians have also fuelled the 
memory of the referendum for political purposes. The result of this collec-
18. Cuadras, Catalonia; Kraus and Vergés, The Catalan Process; Martí and Cetrà, “The 2015 
Catalan election”; Orriols and Rodon, “The 2015 Catalan election”.
19. Cetrà, Casanas-Adam and Tàrrega, “The 2017 Catalan independence referendum”.
20. Catalan government, First of October.
21. Europa Press, “Interior eleva a 33 los policías”.
22. CEO, Enquesta sobre context polític a Catalunya 2018.
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tively constructed narrative is a mythification of 1 October as a day when 
the people of Catalonia “won their right to be independent”, “learnt how to 
be a people” or simply “definitively emotionally disconnected from Spain”.23
In relation to the latter comment, the political symbols associated with the 
central state were seriously discredited, enhancing the level of what is known 
as “disaffection” between the Catalan nationalists and the Spanish national 
project. For instance, 73.9% of the pro-independence citizens would now not 
vote for the 1978 Spanish constitution.24 The rule of law embodied in it was 
the main argument put forward by the central government to deny Catalonia 
a self-determination referendum. There was a similar reaction to the Spanish 
king, who gave a hard-line address two days after the poll, pledging to protect 
non-secessionist Catalans from their own government.25
However, there is also a disconnection between the anti-secessionist citizens 
and the regional institutions and symbols.26 These events have left a complex 
scenario in a region that has multiple and often overlapping identities and 
national loyalties. In this respect, only 28.2% of Catalans feel themselves to 
be “only Catalan”, while 5.1% state that they are “only Spanish”. The rest of 
the population have a mixed national identity.27 Views are similar on the 
independence issue, with the population virtually divided into two halves.28
It is for the reasons extensively set out here that the renaming of streets in 
Catalonia has been a deeply divisive matter. This point is not only associated 
with the secessionist referendum, but with the Spanish state symbols as well. 
Nevertheless, majority nationalism would be expected to depict their par-
ticular symbols as representative of all citizens regardless of their political 
23. These statements were asserted by pro-independence Catalans after the referendum. 
All of them are extracted from media reports. About this topic, see Basta, The state between 
minority and majority nationalism, and Mueller, “Catalonia”.
24. CEO, “Baròmetre d’Opinió Política 3a Onada 2018”. About the symbolic dimension of 
constitutionalism and the legal frame, see Basta, “Imagined institutions”.
25. Sánchez Ugart, “Enquesta de l’Ara”.
26. The CEO and CIS barometers show that non-secessionist Catalan citizens feel more 
attached to state symbols, hold a worse opinion about the regional government or feel, on 
average, more Spanish than Catalan.
27. CEO, “Baròmetre d’Opinió Política 3a Onada 2018”.
28. Ibid.
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ideology. Before considering the empirical case and presenting the results, 
the next section provides a wider theoretical framework grounded in the 
literature about majority nationalism.
3. Majority nationalism and street names: theoretical 
framework
Two hypotheses arise from the theoretical framework. On the one hand, it 
is argued that the symbols linked to the state are presented as neutral and 
representative of all citizens regardless of their ideology, while the pro-in-
dependence referendum and the act of renaming the streets are accused of 
being partisan and deeply divisive (subsection 3.2). On the other hand, it is 
held that the mainstream rhetoric of majority nationalism in Spain is strongly 
linked to the democratic transition and is symbols, the constitution being 
the cornerstone of all of them (subsection 3.3). The theoretical section begins 
with the exploration of the relationship between nation building and street 
naming in the multinational state.
3.1. Nation building and street naming in the 
multinational state
In multinational polities like Spain, possession of the tools used to promote 
a particular national identity is frequently in dispute. For instance, in 2012 
the former Spanish Minister of Education, José Ignacio Wert, opened a bitter 
controversy by stating that “our aim is to make Catalan children Spanish”.29 
The education system in Spain is left to the autonomous communities (re-
gional governments), and the central government wanted to regain control 
of some powers with the explicit aim of nation building. The underlying 
assumption was that the Catalan nationalists were using schools to “indoc-
trinate” children against Spain. The Catalan authorities reacted fiercely to 
maintain their control over this precious tool for nationalist policies.
This incident is typical of multinational contexts. Minority nationalism usu-
ally engages in nation-building projects to strengthen demands for more 
29. Sanz, Wert: “Nuestro interés es españolizar a los niños catalanes”.
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political autonomy, and vice versa: it demands political autonomy in order to 
obtain more tools for nation building.30 In comparison, majority nationalism 
is often wary of giving more powers to the regions with claims of nationhood 
because they are fearful of this “vicious circle”:  autonomy leading to nation 
building, nation building leading to more demands for autonomy, and so on, 
until secession appears almost inevitable.31
In this sense, state institutions are used as means to incorporate the mem-
bers of national minorities into the majority national identity, and this aim 
often collides with the efforts of the former to promote a particular minority 
identity with the opposite purpose. Nation building in multinational states 
usually involves some kind of competition between different national identi-
ties.32 This paper focuses on the commemorative street names in Catalonia as 
the scenario in which this cultural battle takes place. The municipal council 
is the institution responsible for street naming, so the labels chosen depend 
on the shifting political majorities at local level.
National identity is “constructed by and experienced through shared symbols 
and representations”.33 The importance of street names and commemorative 
spots for competing nation-building projects is, therefore, that they contrib-
ute to the symbolic construction of identity and common heritage, usually 
giving a mythical aura to particular events.34 Street naming is thus a tool 
for nation building, and, more generally, sites associated with memory are 
fundamental for the symbolic production of national differences.35
As well as being constructed, identities are also socially negotiated in specific 
historical and political contexts.36 Usually, the construction and shaping of 
the national “self” reflects prevalent interests and power relationships.37 In 
particular, nation building stems from certain needs of political elites and 
30. Gagnon et al., Contemporary Majority Nationalism.
31. Norman, Negotiating Nationalism, 73-74.
32. Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies”.
33. Azaryahu and Kook, Mapping the nation.
34. Azaryahu and Kook, Mapping the Nation; Kertzer, Politics and Symbols.
35. Castiñeira, “Imagined nations”.
36. Ibid, 199.
37. Ibid.
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their ability to manipulate symbols and notions of common heritage.38 In this 
sense, the naming of a street is a political act expressing power and author-
ity.39 Here, a particular version of the past serves to legitimise ideological 
claims as well as justifying as-yet-unfulfilled aspirations.40 As Smith argues, 
nationalist archaeologists use the past for political purposes.41
The effect of this constructed identity is that it allows an official version 
of history to be incorporated into spheres of social and spatial practices of 
everyday life.42 This idea goes beyond Billing’s “banal nationalism”, 43 as there 
is a tendency for the everyday to exist separately from the influence of public 
institutions.44 As Burkitt puts it, “The production of daily reality does not 
occur somewhere beyond our reach in, say, the ‘higher’ echelons of the state, 
and is then imposed upon us. Rather, the reality of everyday life — the sum 
total of all our relations — is built on the ground, in daily activities and 
transactions.”45
Public institutions and their nation-building aims do have an impact on 
everyday life, but the point here is that the people are ultimately responsible 
for making sense of or consuming different kinds of knowledge, rationali-
ties and nationalisms that emanate from the institutions.46 Nationalism is 
experienced on a daily basis as a “messy, complex and contested arena of […] 
identity formation”.47 Although the state may want to foster a specific identi-
ty by nurturing a particular symbology, people can respond to it in different 
ways. The renaming of the streets by the pro-independence authorities is an 
example of groups resisting state projects by removing the former labels, but 
38. Kertzer, Politics and Symbols.
39. Palonen, Regarding Street Names Politically.
40. Azaryahu and Kook, Mapping the Nation.
41. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and nationalism.
42. Azaryahu, “Street Names and Iconography”.
43. Billing, Banal Nationalism; Crameri, “Banal catalanism?”.
44. Rhys and Merriman, “Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism”.
45. Burkitt, “The Time and Space of Everyday Life”.
46. Rhys and Merriman, “Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism”.
47. Whitehead, “Between the Marvellous and the Mundane”.
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the new secessionist name was also contested by the rival group on similar 
grounds.48
The extent to which street naming is contested has to do with its inclusiv-
ity. Local authorities can accept the symbols of different groups, and they 
can choose names that may be consensual for both communities. However, 
strong partisanship can also occur, as some nationalist politicians may want 
to promote an event or political figure rejected by the rival national group.49 
In contexts of polarisation like the one we are analysing, the goal of inclu-
siveness is difficult to reach. Each of the two nationalisms protests against 
the other’s symbols, and it seems that no commemorative street name can 
be consensually agreed.
To conclude this subsection, we have thus two very different aims. On the one 
hand, secessionists wanted to “rename the past”, a typical action in contexts 
of regime change.50 In fact, the pro-independence Catalan authorities want-
ed to found their own new regime, but failed. On the other hand, the state 
wants to recover full authority in the Catalan region and its representatives 
cannot accept losing the power to impose their official national narrative. 
If commemoration and history are used to legitimise and consolidate state 
dominance, the street-naming battle is definitely a crucial one for the reasons 
already extensively set out.
3.2. Majority nationalism and the alleged neutrality of 
the state
The term “nationalism” is one of the most hotly contested and controversial 
concepts in political theory. One of the major scholars of nationalism, An-
thony D. Smith, once noted that this term has been used to refer to political 
processes, feelings of identity, forms of political discourse, ideology and po-
litical platforms of all kinds.51 The efforts to build a concise but also a widely 
accepted definition of nationalism have not been very successful. Never-
48. Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups.
49. Norman, Negotiating Nationalism, 47.
50. Azaryahu, “German Reunification and the Politics of Street Names”.
51. Smith, National Identity, 72.
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theless, the following statement by Gellner is often quoted: “Nationalism is 
primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit 
should be congruent.”52 More recently, Hechter gave a similar description of 
nationalism as “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the 
nation congruent with those of its governance unit”.53
According to these views, nationalism is mainly about self-determination. 
In this respect, minority or stateless nationalism will often seek a political 
unit outside the existing state, while majority nationalism will try to re-
move the competing national projects within its borders. Therefore, when 
the boundaries between the governance unit and the nation finally converge, 
nationalism is supposed to disappear. Nevertheless, the problem with this 
characterisation is that political institutions will continue to nurture a par-
ticular identity and to foster some degree of national loyalty and solidarity 
among the members of the community. As Wayne Norman wrote about 
national self-determination, it is also essential for this national “self” to be 
“created, nurtured, shaped and motivated”,54 and we can also understand 
these actions as a form of nationalism.
In line with Norman’s assertions, I hold that nationalism articulates its pro-
ject both in terms of self-determination and in terms of nation building, or 
literally “the attempt to determine the ‘self’ of the nation”.55 Nation mobilis-
ing, as a strategy to generate support for a policy on the grounds of national 
feeling, would also be a form of nationalist politics. In this respect, if minor-
ity nationalism is usually the project of a stateless group, we can understand 
majority nationalism as the “articulation of a national community that usu-
ally has its core within the majority group and/or within the representations 
of the state’s national identity as that group sees it”.56 Moreover, it seeks to 
strengthen the state with which it so strongly identifies.57 In the context of 
multinational polities like Spain, we can clearly identify a Spanish majority 
nationalism, which is embedded in state practices, symbols and discourse; 
52. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1.
53. Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 7.
54. Norman, Negotiating Nationalism, 23-29
55. Ibid, 23
56. Lecours and Nootens, “Understanding Majority Nationalism”, 10
57. Coakley, “National Majorities in New States”, 102
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and several minority nationalisms, among which the Catalan case is most 
relevant here.
However, it is also worth noting the conceptual strength of the category 
“state nationalism”, or “state-led nationalism” in Tilly’s words,58 although I use 
the term “majority nationalism”. On the one hand, in Catalonia it is less clear 
that the majority group is that of the people who identify with the state. The 
state must also be more present in the region with its nationalising efforts 
precisely because its hegemony is challenged by Catalan nationalists. On the 
other hand, the people who identify with the state in Catalonia constitute, 
with the rest of Spaniards, a clear majority group in the whole country and 
this also affects their perspective within Catalonia in the way the next par-
agraph sets out.
The case for using the term “majority nationalism” is grounded on the idea 
that the shape and direction of nationalism are strongly affected by public 
institutions, but people’s beliefs and practices are also essential in the re-
production of a particular national identity. The majority group not only 
passively receives some form of nation building by the state, the state is also 
influenced by the sensitivities of this majority group. There is thus a two-way 
effect. The best way to sum up this idea is to say that the state is first and 
foremost projecting the nationalism of the majority group, and the majority 
group, in turn, reinforces its own identity and national loyalty with the na-
tionalising efforts of the state. In this respect, it is assumed that those Cata-
lans who identify with the state constitute a part of this majority group, and 
thus it is appropriate to label their representatives in the region as “majority 
nationalists” although within Catalonia they may not form a clear majority.
Beyond extreme behaviours of national majorities, such as the Serbs or Hutus 
in the early 1990s, the truth is that in liberal democracies the nationalism 
projected by the state is barely visible. States usually implement nation-build-
ing strategies in almost imperceptible ways with the help of state apparatuses 
such as the education system, political practices, symbols or traditions.59 In 
fact, these symbols are essential because they are hardly noticed, falling into 
58. Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe”.
59. Eisenstadt and Rokkan, Building states and nations.
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Billing’s category of “banal nationalism”.60 They are useful to invoke, trans-
port, and define particular visions of a shared national identity.61
On the other hand, minority nationalism emerges through its interaction 
with the central state. Precisely because it challenges the symbols and prac-
tices of the majority group, which are taken for granted, it is frequently 
labelled “nationalist” in a pejorative way, while the majority see themselves 
merely as “patriotic” and non-nationalist.62 We know, however, that we live 
in a world of nations and no one escapes a minimal degree of national loyalty 
and identity, even though people in established nations tend to see national-
ism as belonging to others.63
In this respect, the majority group and its elites tend to talk about their 
allegiance to the state by appealing to universal claims like democracy or 
liberal values. In contrast with this, minority nationalism is usually seen as, 
by nature, bad, regressive, and irrationally based.64 It is often viewed as a 
premodern force intending to protect or promote old-fashioned aspects and 
privileges, while the majority group supposedly stands for a national blanket 
settlement, concerned only about rights and liberties for all. The empirical 
analysis of this paper reflects on and provides new insights regarding this 
issue.
However, the point is that the state is already promoting the identity of 
the majority group and institutionalising its main features and practices. A 
state’s neutrality in many cases serves to protect the national ambitions of 
the dominant community.65 In established polities, the idea of “coexistence” 
is defined by and around the majority group, and in this sense identity issues 
are rarely discussed because this group tends to see itself as the bearer of 
shared national values.66
60. Billing, Banal Nationalism.
61. Nieguth and Raney, “Nation-Building and Canada’s National Symbolic Order”.
62. Dieckhoff, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Nationalism”.
63. Billing, “Banal Nationalism”.
64. Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms?”.
65. Dieckhoff, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Nationalism”.
66. Dupont, “Cultural Diversity and Modernity”.
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For all these reasons, majority nationalism is expected to frame its symbols as 
neutral and representative of all citizens regardless of their ideology, while the 
secessionists would allegedly be accused of being deeply divisive. The next sec-
tion deals with the majority nationalism under discussion in this paper, namely, 
Spanish nationalism. I argue that its contemporary features and narrative were 
largely created during the democratic transition at the end of the 1970s, and 
thus the rhetoric of the majority nationalism in Spain is strongly grounded 
in that period. Furthermore, the constitution and the crown are specifically 
analysed since they are the symbols under dispute in our empirical case.
3.3. Spanish majority nationalism: 1978 as a turning 
point
After 40 years of hot nationalism under Franco’s authoritarian regime, the 
democratic transition required a redefinition of ‘Spanishness’ by the end of 
the 1970s.67 The dictatorship was characterised by the defence of an ethnic 
concept of Spain, based on religion and the Castilian language. The dictator 
also launched highly centralist policies68 and attempted to suppress minority 
nationalisms by repressing their languages and cultures.69 The monopoli-
sation of the Spanish nationalist discourse by Franco’s regime ultimately 
discredited the national symbols after his death in 1975. For instance, par-
ticularly among liberals and left-wingers, the very use of the word “Spain” 
was avoided in public over that period.70
In that context, the symbols of the democratic transition contributed to gen-
erating new benchmarks for modern Spain. The vindication of its accomplish-
ments replaced the old Francoist rhetoric as an attempt to shape the national 
identity into a more liberal and democratic paradigm.71 An attempt was also 
made to “water down” the national project to include minority nations. The 
1978 constitution was seen as the institutional embodiment of the new re-
gime. In addition, other elements, such as the figure of the king and the ideas 
67. Núñez, “What is Spanish Nationalism Today?”.
68. Muro and Quiroga, “Spanish Nationalism”.
69. Ibid.
70. Santiago-Guervós, El Léxico Político de la Transición Española, 192-251.
71. Núñez, “What is Spanish Nationalism Today?”.
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of consensus and modernisation, have been keystones of the contemporary 
Spanish national discourse.72
Furthermore, all these factors are still present in the country’s mainstream 
politics. The media and the politicians of both left and right actively appeal 
to the “spirit of the transition”, which is still identified with democracy, 
consensus and unity. The period is largely seen as a time when people from 
very different perspectives agreed to cease hostilities and build a common 
future. As Druliolle puts it, “the Spanish transition is remembered as an epic 
journey to democracy” which is “omnipresent” in contemporary hegemonic 
political discourse.73
The transition is also “a symbolic and normative resource that is reactivated to 
overcome periods of crisis”,74 and the current political situation in Catalonia is 
not an exception. In recent years, the adjective “constitutionalist”, which is sup-
posed to define the parties accepting the legacy of the democratic transition, 
has been closely identified with taking a strong stance against independence. 
Moreover, other projects that also challenge the established political setting 
are rejected for similar reasons,75 since it is common to identify the 1978 regime 
with the very idea of democracy. Just as the 1 October referendum has become 
a new myth of Catalan nationalism, I hold that the transición and its symbols 
are undoubtedly key features of the contemporary Spanish national narrative.
In particular, the importance of the 1978 constitution for the secessionist 
challenge derives from the undiscussed principle of national unity. Despite 
their quite different stances on ‘Spanishness’, the so-called “constitutionalist” 
parties agree with the idea that the Spanish people form the sole collective 
entity enjoying full sovereignty.76 Article 2 of the constitution clearly states 
72. Later we will see the importance of the king. Juan Carlos I in particular was seen as 
the deliverer of democracy during the Spanish transition. Even the Socialist Party, which 
supposedly defines itself as republican, is a strong supporter of the monarchy.
73. Druliolle, “Democracy Captured by its Imaginary”.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. The Popular Party, the Socialist Party and Citizens define themselves as “constitution-
alists”. Nevertheless, while the socialists have historically been more nationally inclusive, 
upholding a “plural Spain”, the other two organisations take a hard-line position on ‘Span-
ishness’, and are less tolerant of minority nationalisms.
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that “the constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish nation, 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”. This article has been 
widely used to rule out a referendum about the independence of Catalonia.77 
In this sense, Spanish politicians have been able to mask a nationalist claim 
about the country’s unity behind the liberal and democratic rhetoric of con-
stitutionalism.78
Along similar lines, from the mid-80s a particular translation of the Haber-
masian concept of “constitutional patriotism”79 has provided new sources of 
legitimacy for modern Spanish nationalism. The democratic transition and 
its resulting constitution is often expressed as a founding moment of contem-
porary Spain, allegedly based on an agreement about the rights and liberties 
of all citizens, regardless of the region where they live.80 From this point of 
view, minority nationalists are seen as a threat to this liberal, pluralistic and 
democratic common project. The empirical section will provide new evidence 
regarding this theoretical assumption.
Nonetheless, this rhetoric clashes with the largely accepted assumption that 
Spain was not created in 1978 but had existed for a long time before this. In 
this sense, the constitution is the renewed expression of a pre-existing nation-
al community with ancient roots. In line with the writings of the well-known 
philosopher Ortega y Gasset, for many people Spain “consists of a mixture 
of historical determinism grounded in the idea that Castile had been the 
forging power of Spanish unity under the monarchy […] and a search for a 
‘common project’ for all the Spanish peoples, expressed initially during the 
discovery of America”.81 For instance, the socialist and one of the “fathers of 
the constitution”, Gregorio Peces-Barba, once stated that “we take for granted 
that Spain, as a Nation, did exist before the Constitution”.82 Some authors 
have provocatively labelled all these ideas “constitutional nationalism”.83
77. Constitutional Court, STC 114/2017.
78. Cetrà and Harvey, “Explaining accommodation and resistance”.
79. See Habermas, The New Conservatism.
80. Muñoz, From national Catholicism to democratic patriotism?
81. Núñez, “What is Spanish Nationalism Today?”.
82. Quoted by Bastida, La Nación Española y el Nacionalismo Constitucional, 156.
83. Ibid.
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Before the left-wing party Podemos entered the political stage in May 2014, 
hardly any Spanish political leaders ever spoke about multinationalism.84 This 
nation in existence before the 1978 constitution is strongly identified with the 
symbols, language, practices and beliefs of the majority group. Both in terms 
of recognition and institutional arrangements,85 the so-called “historical na-
tionalities”, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, have not been fully ac-
commodated within the framework of the state. In this respect, while minority 
nationalists saw the 1978 constitution as an opportunity to move towards some 
kind of multinational federalism, for most Spanish parties it was the final stage 
of the decentralisation process.86 Meanwhile, the 2010 court resolution against 
the new statute of autonomy was perceived precisely as a definitive “failure of 
accommodation” for many Catalans,87 opening the way to secessionist demands.
Beyond the constitution, the Crown is another relevant element both for the 
transition period and for the contemporary official Spanish narrative. It is 
widely accepted that the former King Juan Carlos I played a crucial role in 
1981, allegedly saving the country from a military coup. He was initially also 
seen as a powerful mediator for reconciling competing nationalisms within 
Spain,88 and the monarchy was the most highly valued institution by Span-
iards in all surveys until the outbreak of the economic crisis. His heir Felipe 
took the throne in June 2014, amid several corruption scandals regarding 
the monarchy. During the Catalan crisis of 2017, the new king gave a hard-
line speech using the rhetoric about the constitution as a democratic tenet 
in defence of the country’s unity.89
84. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some socialist politicians recognise that Spain is a 
“nation of nations”, although it has never been an official position of the PSOE during the 
democratic period.
85. On the latter issue, some authors speak of “incomplete federalism” (see Grau, 2000). Al-
though the regions have a reasonable level of self-government, the power-sharing dimension 
of the Spanish territorial arrangement is definitely underdeveloped. Minority nationalists 
are not explicitly represented in central institutions, and they barely hold typical federal 
tools to directly influence the state’s governance.
86. Núñez, What is Spanish Nationalism Today?
87. Serrano, “Catalonia: a Failure of Accommodation?”.
88. Conversi, Spain’s Path to Democratic Transition.
89. Some scholars criticised the speech as inappropriate because the monarchy has a con-
stitutional duty of neutrality. For them, the king gave up his role of arbitrator and acted as 
a partisan politician. The “constitutionalist” parties, however, celebrated his intervention as 
guarantor of the Spanish unity and the rule of law amid a deep constitutional crisis.
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To summarise this subsection, I have argued that the democratic transition is 
at the core of contemporary Spanish official narrative. I have also presented 
the symbols under dispute in our empirical case: the constitution and the 
Crown. This, together with the assumption that majority nationalism tends 
to present its symbols as neutral, while accusing the other’s as divisive (section 
3.2), have laid the ground to understand the case under analysis.
4. Presentation and findings of the research
4.1. Case selection
The case under study is Catalonia, since it is appropriate and relevant for the 
purposes of the paper. Catalonia is considered a stateless nation90 within a 
multinational framework. In Spain, both a majority nationalism and several 
minority nationalisms coexist. Moreover, the events of October 2017 and 
its consequences give scholars an enticing opportunity to study how the 
former reacted to the latter’s pro-independence initiatives. More specifically 
the research is aimed at discovering how majority nationalism depicted the 
renaming of streets due to the 1 October 2017 referendum.
In this respect, countless municipalities have renamed their streets in Cata-
lonia since the referendum took place. However, most of them have simply 
named new spots, or have changed neutral street names like those related to 
trees or mountains. For the purposes of our research, it is especially inter-
esting to analyse those cases in which the pro-independence authorities have 
commemorated the referendum but have also removed those names linked 
to the state. This fact allows us to better analyse the cultural battle between 
both nationalisms and thus see more clearly the behaviour of that of the 
majority. Only two cities fit into this criterion: Girona and Sant Cugat del 
Vallès. The former names were “constitution” and “king” respectively. The 
examination of only a few municipalities allows us to make a deeper analysis, 
which is most suited to our needs. The trade-off between breadth and depth 
is easy to resolve here with respect to the purposes of the paper.
90. Guibernau, “Nations without states”; Keating, “nations against the state”.
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In particular, we are dealing with two medium-sized municipalities91 with 
a secessionist majority in almost all the elections held since 2015, when the 
Catalan process began. They are above the Catalan average in this respect 
(see Table 1). After the referendum of 2017, many individual citizens and civil 
organisations pushed for the replacement of the former names, framed as 
symbols of Spanish repression, in order to commemorate 1 October.
Table 2. Secessionist vote share for several elections since 2015
Election Local 2015 Regional 2015 General 2015 General 2016 Regional 2017
Girona 62.71% 64.63% 46.99% 48.21% 62.16%
Sant Cugat 63.38% 57.98% 40.72% 41.76% 55.26%
Average for  
Catalonia 
45.21% 47.80% 31.06% 32.63% 47.50%
The parties considered as pro-independence are CiU and its successors as well as ERC and CUP. 
Source: own creation.
1,522 signatures were gathered in Girona supporting the renaming of “Con-
stitution Square” as “1 October Square” during the weeks after the poll. The 
initiative’s promoters held that the constitution had been used to assault 
peaceful citizens and, for that reason, it ceased to represent the majority 
of people.92 As we have argued, the constitution as the embodiment of the 
rule of law was the main argument used by the Spanish government against 
the referendum. In Girona, the “constitutionalist” parties (PP, PSOE and Cs) 
gathered 31.68% of the votes in the general elections of 2016, while in the rest 
of Spain they received 68.7% of the popular vote. 18 out of 25 local councillors 
are pro-independence.
Accordingly, and after a heated debate, a meeting of the full municipal coun-
cil approved the proposal to rename “Constitution Square” as “1 October 
Square” by a large majority in February 2018. The square was officially in-
augurated with its new name two months later. That day, a commemorative 
plaque was put up with the following controversial statement: “During the 
referendum held on 1 October 2017, the citizens of Girona were brutally as-
saulted by the Spanish security forces while freely and peacefully exercising 
91. Girona has 98,255 inhabitants (2016) and is located in the north of Catalonia. The former 
Catalan president Carles Puigdemont is an ex-mayor of the city (2011-2016). Sant Cugat del 
Vallès is near Barcelona and has a population of 89,516 (2017).
92. CCMA, “Madrenas: “la constitució espanyola no mereix cap homenatge”, 201.
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their right to vote. This square is intended to offer testimony of admiration 
and remembrance of the people’s dignified behaviour and courage”.
By contrast, non-secessionist politicians and “constitutionalist” platforms 
argued that the 1978 constitution is part of a common history and represents 
many people in Girona. In this respect, some of them asked the local author-
ity not to change the name of Constitution Square, suggesting that the local 
political majorities should mark a new and as-yet unnamed street or square 
with the 1ST of October label. Other voices simply did not agree with naming 
anything after this pro-independence event.
On the other hand, Sant Cugat del Vallès removed the name of King’s Square 
dedicated to Juan Carlos I in May 2018. Like the Spanish constitution, for 
many this king is a symbol of freedom and democracy as he is supposed to 
have saved the country from a military coup in 1981. However, his heir Felipe 
VI gave a hard-line address on 3 October 2017, two days after the referendum, 
in which he opposed independence and promised to protect non-secessionist 
Catalans from their own government. This speech dramatically reduced his 
already weak popularity among pro-independence citizens.93 The Spanish 
state survey agency ceased to ask questions about the monarchy in 2015 when 
the institution’s approval ratings were low not only in Catalonia but in the 
whole country.94 The last survey launched in July 2018 by another company 
stated that support for the Crown in Catalonia barely reaches 20 percentage 
points.95
In this respect, a full meeting of the Sant Cugat del Vallès council agreed 
to change the name of “King’s Square” to “1 October Square” by 18 votes in 
favour and seven against in May 2018. Four months later, the council put up 
a commemorative plaque with a statement by a deceased secessionist leader: 
“We are not here to find a dream, we are the dream”.96 The decision was also 
contested by many citizens. Some people, as republicans, felt it was right to 
change the name of the square, but they did not agree with the pro-inde-
93. Sánchez Ugart, “Enquesta de L’Ara”.
94. CIS, Barómetro de Abril.
95. CTXT, “El apoyo a la monarquía”.
96. The statement is from Muriel Casals, a former president of Òmnium Cultural, one of the 
main secessionist civil organisations in Catalonia. Casals died as a result of a road accident 
in 2016. At the time, she was also a member of the Catalan Parliament.
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pendence proposal. For others, as in Girona, it was simply unacceptable to 
change the name.
4.2. Methodology
The proposed research question — how was the renaming of streets depicted 
by the representatives of majority nationalism in the context of the 2017 Catalan 
secessionist referendum? — is typical of qualitative studies, and particularly 
those aimed at discovering how a certain event was covered by the media 
and what was said and in what way.97 Moreover, the nature of the research 
question leads us to select a method based on frame analysis as the best way 
to answer the enquiry,98 because frame analysis enables the researcher to 
know precisely how a particular actor (majority nationalists) depicts a certain 
object (renaming of the streets).
Framing is understood as an act of selecting “certain aspects of a perceived 
reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”.99 A frame thus denotes a 
“schemata of interpretation”100 of the social world. This sort of analysis helps 
us to recognise how majority nationalism defined the renaming of streets in 
Catalonia and the moral assessment of it.
More precisely, we have analysed both their assessment of their own sym-
bols — the constitution and the monarchy — and their evaluation regarding 
the pro-independence leaders, the secessionist referendum and the act of 
renaming itself. The second step in the research has taken a mix between a 
deductive and inductive approach by identifying the main frames used by 
the actors under study and grouping them into several categories. The main 
frames introduced in the theoretical framework and its operationalisation 
are as follows:
97. Altheide, Qualitative media analysis.
98. Helbling, Hoeglinger and Wüest, “How Political Parties Frame European Integration”.
99. Entman, “Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm”.
100. Goffman, Frame Analysis, 21.
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State neutrality and representativeness
Stemming from the theoretical framework, I hold that the representatives of 
majority nationalism in Catalonia perceive their own symbols as neutral and 
representative of all citizens regardless of their ideology, while the pro-in-
dependence symbols are accused of being partisan and deeply divisive. The 
frame of neutrality has been operationalised in three dimensions:
a) Coexistence, meaning that the state symbols ensure coexistence because 
they represent all citizens regardless of their ideology.
b) Rule of law, meaning that the state symbols follow the legitimate rule of 
law, thus identifying legality and official status with a neutral framework.
c) Democracy, meaning that the state symbols are the embodiment of the 
ideals of democracy and liberal values within which all citizens live. The un-
derlying assumption, as has been pointed out in the theoretical framework, 
is that democracy and liberal values have no national content.
Pro-independence partisanship and division
I hold that the representatives of majority nationalism framed both the se-
cessionist referendum event and the act of renaming itself as partisan and 
deeply divisive. The secessionist leaders were likewise accused. The opera-
tionalisation of this idea is as follows:
a) Division, meaning that the pro-independence activities endanger coexist-
ence because the secessionist referendum is partisan and the act of renaming 
the streets is deeply divisive.
b) Illegality, meaning that the 1 October referendum was illegal and the act 
of renaming the street situates the city beyond the margins of law, which 
generates division and social tensions.
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Symbols rooted in a historical myth
According to the theoretical subsection 3.3, I argue that the historical narra-
tive underpinning this political debate is that of the democratic transition. 
Here, the constitution and the crown are seen by majority nationalists as 
benchmarks of that period, so the reason for maintaining them is to re-
spect the 1978 collective success. In contrast, the pro-independence leaders 
are accused of wanting to rewrite history. The frame here is thus coded as 
“historical”.
Others
In an inductive way, two other frames have been identified, which will be 
coded as “others” because both are theoretically irrelevant. Nevertheless, 
in pursuit of transparency and integrity they are described here and they 
will  also be explained in the presentation of the results. On the one hand, 
the representatives of majority nationalism have referred to the majority 
principle both in terms of the support of state symbols-meaning that the 
majority of citizens feel attached to them — and rejection of the purposes 
of the secessionist leaders — meaning that most people actually do not want 
to change the street’s name —.
On the other hand, the actors under study have invoked the frame of “useless-
ness” regarding the act of renaming the street. With this idea, they expressed 
that the renaming initiative does not improve people’s life and they also 
meant that the only purpose of this activity is to improve the pro-independ-
ence parties electoral expectations.
More than 20 fragments of documents have been analysed, covering the min-
utes and records of full council meetings, political speeches and media reports 
(see appendix). The choice has been exhaustive. The actors under study are 
the representatives of majority nationalism, which include the speakers for 
the so-called constitutionalist platforms, the Popular Party (PP), Citizens (Cs) 
and the Socialist Party (PSC). The last of these cases is more ambiguous,101 but 
101. The Catalan socialist party is, formally, an independent branch of the Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE). Some of their members even consider Catalonia a nation, but all of 
them are federalists and clearly stand against a referendum on self-determination. Although 
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has been included because of their clear constitutionalist and anti-secessionist 
referendum stance. The representatives of the “Commons” and the Green Par-
ty (ICV) have been excluded from the analysis as they are against secession 
but do not share the hegemonic standpoint about the idea of Spain.102 Both 
the Socialists and the “Commons”/Greens are the parties showing the most 
mixed identities in Catalonia.103
The selected documents have been coded using the core sentences method. 
By “core sentence” (CS) we mean the most basic structure of each actor’s 
statement. It includes the subject (political actor), the object (issue) and the 
moral assessment about the latter (frame). 98 of them have been gathered 
in total. I allowed for more than one frame per CS because some of them 
invoke multiple frames. The number of coded frames is thus superior (107) 
to the total number of CS. The reader may think that the total number of CS 
is rather small. This is true for two reasons: on the one hand, and although 
my selection has been exhaustive, the coverage of the renaming initiative 
was not very sizeable. On the other hand, I have only coded sentences that 
are clearly attributable to an actor and to a specific stance, leaving uncoded 
those propositions that are either irrelevant for the subject under study or 
ambiguously worded.
My approach differs from other qualitative content studies, which typically 
focus on the whole document, by coding the sentence here at propositional 
level. This allows us to carry out a more in-depth analysis of the subject under 
study, and enhances the transparency of both the methods and the results. 
Table 2 shows four examples — one per issue — of core sentence coding. 
For reasons of space, the categories relating to basic data — city, type of 
document and date — have been removed. I have found only one frame that 
has not been coded. In Girona, the mayor (CiU) avoided mentioning that the 
they support constitutional reform, the PSC share with the other representatives of majority 
nationalism a positive stance towards democratic transition, maintaining the importance 
of the 1978 constitution. In short, they clearly feel attached to the Spanish national project, 
even though they would like to reform the current political context.
102. Unlike the Socialist Party, the Greens are far more critical of the 1978 constitution and 
are also clearly republicans. Some branches even talk about going beyond “the 1978 regime”. 
Although a majority of them are against independence, they agree with secessionists on a 
referendum about the political future of Catalonia. Furthermore, they tend to avoid the 
nationalist debate and focus on right-left issues.
103. See CEO, 2018a: 60.
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renaming proposal was against the constitution, while the secessionist left-
wing leader (CUP) did mention it. In this respect, the Popular Party speaker 
referred to the CUP spokesperson as “honest”. The remark is clearly ironic 
and this is the reason for the exclusion.
Core sentence 61: “The origins of democracy and freedom in Catalonia are 
in the 1978 constitution.”
Core sentence 76: “1 October is only a symbol of division and social tension, 
illegality and an institutional coup.”
Core sentence 62: “Your support for the most radical secessionism, your 
sectarianism, and your lack of foresight, makes you [the CiU mayor] a real 
danger to social peace in our city.”
Core sentence 23: “They also talk about majorities, but I know many people 
in Girona that don’t agree with the change, and with this decision they are 
not being respected.”
Table 3. Examples of the coding of the core sentences
Core sentence Actor Issue Frame 1 Frame 2
61 PSC State-based name Democracy Historical
76 Cs Secessionist referendum Division Illegality
62 Cs Secessionist leaders Division
23 PP The act of renaming Other
Source: own creation.
4.3. Results
Table 3 shows how the representatives of majority nationalism depicted their 
own symbols: the constitution in the case of Girona and the monarchy in 
Sant Cugat del Vallès. Both are the symbols that were removed from the 
street names and substituted for the commemoration of the October 2017 
secessionist referendum.
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Table 4. Number of core sentences referring to how the representatives of majority 
nationalism depicted the symbols linked to the state (the constitution in the case of 
Girona and the Crown in the case of Sant Cugat del Vallès) 
Frames The Constitution The Crown TOTAL
Coexistence 8 0 8
Rule of Law 3 0 3
Democracy 7 0 7
Historical 6 1 7
Others 3 1 4
TOTAL 27 2 29
Source: own creation.
At first glance, we can clearly see that the constitution is far more vindicated 
than the crown. 27 core sentences are attributable to statements regarding 
the Spanish carta magna, while only 2 propositions talk about the monarchy. 
This is consistent with the theoretical framework given the importance of 
the constitution in contemporary Spain. The low popularity of the monarchy 
in Catalonia could also give sense to these results, and would explain why in 
Sant Cugat del Vallès the representatives of majority nationalism focused on 
the critique against the pro-independence referendum rather than in vindi-
cating the old symbol.
In this respect, the monarchy was defended once in historical terms and on 
another occasion under the “majority principle” frame — coded as “other” —. 
Provocatively, the Cs spokesman in Sant Cugat del Vallès asked the mayor: “If 
tomorrow we bring 1,500 signatures to change the name of the square to “King 
Felipe VI”, would you respect ‘the will of the people’?”.104 He was referring 
ironically to one of the slogans of the Catalan secessionist movement, namely, 
that “the people” had voted for independence and therefore the authorities 
had to respect their will.
In Girona, the constitution was mainly framed as a tool which ensures co-
existence. For instance, the leader of the Popular Party in this city stated 
that “the constitution represents us all because we all fit into it; it is a focal 
point for everyone”.105 In the same speech, she also referred to democracy and 
104. Sant Cugat del Vallès City Council, Acta del Ple 21/05/2018.
105. Girona City Council, Acta del Ple 12/02/2018.
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liberal values: “The constitution sets the rules of the game and guarantees 
freedom, security and equality for everyone.”106 This rhetoric, along with 
the importance of a common history that cannot be removed, were relevant 
arguments supporting the former commemorative street name. On this sub-
ject, the spokesperson for the socialist party in Girona stated that “This is the 
mistake of street renaming — attempting to remove a milestone about our 
collective history just because many consider it to be superseded.”107 Finally, 
the constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law was the least important 
frame, together with the majority principle.
One notable difference should be pointed out here regarding the different 
parties. While the Popular Party and Citizens activated the neutrality frame 
through its three dimensions specified in the methodological section — co-
existence, rule of law and democracy —, the Socialist Party made their case 
in support of the constitution based on the historical narrative related to the 
democratic transition.
Table 5. Number of core sentences referring to how the representatives of majority nati-
onalism depicted the attitude of the secessionist leaders, the act of renaming the streets 




Act of renaming TOTAL
Division 33 4 20 57
Illegality 5 3 0 8
Others 1 0 12 13
TOTAL 39 7 32 78 
Source: own creation.
If 29 core sentences were dedicated to vindicating the former symbols, almost 
80 of them referred to the attitudes and actions of the pro-independence side 
(see table 4). This means that, in this debate, the representatives of majori-
ty nationalism prioritised the attacks against secessionism rather than the 
defence of their own symbols. More specifically, the assessment of the 2017 
referendum received limited attention, both the secessionist attitudes and the 
act of renaming the streets being the main topics in the debate.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
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On the one hand, the secessionist leaders were primarily accused of “sectar-
ianism” and “radicalism”, construed here as frames based on division. The 
spokesperson of Citizens in Sant Cugat offers a good example: “your sup-
port for the most radical secessionism, your sectarianism, and your lack of 
foresight, makes you [the CiU mayor] a real danger to social peace in our 
city”.108 The pro-independence local authorities were also accused of promot-
ing illegalities, as the spokesperson of Citizens in Girona stated: “you [a CiU 
councillor] have wanted to destroy the established law by changing the name 
of a square”.109 On the other hand, the secessionist referendum was framed 
as both a divisive and an illegal event.
Finally, the act of renaming the street was not accused of being illegal, basi-
cally because it is a recognised competence of the municipality. Nevertheless, 
the decision to remove the former names to commemorate the 2017 referen-
dum was mostly framed as deeply divisive. The socialist speaker in Girona, for 
instance, expressed that “vindicating the referendum didn’t imply injuring 
anybody: respect and reconciliation are essential in order to guarantee civil 
unity and social cohesion”.110 The representatives of majority nationalism also 
activated two other frames: the “majority principle”, meaning that the initi-
ative did not actually have popular support; and the “uselessness” argument. 
The latter means that the renaming of the street does not improve people’s 
life: “this proposal isn’t urgent and does not respond to a real need in our 
city. It is a populist, electioneering proposal making its supporters out to be 
victims” (by Citizens speaker in Girona).111
Regarding the role of the different parties, it should be noted that the Popular 
Party and Citizens were far harsher than the Socialist Party in the debate. 
The socialists expressed their position in a more moderate way, although all 
of them were highlighting the divisive character of the secessionist attitudes 
and decisions. Precisely this frame, division, was the main argument against 
the pro-independence initiatives. This is also consistent with the most widely 
used frame to support the former symbol, which is coexistence.
108. Sant Cugat del Vallès City Council, Acta del Ple 21/05/2018.
109. Girona City Council, Acta del Ple 12/02/2018.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
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5. Summary and conclusions
This article is grounded on the literature about majority nationalism, a phe-
nomenon that is far less widely studied than the features and behaviour of 
the minority or stateless groups. More specifically, the aim of this research 
has been to explore one of the features of majority nationalism in Western 
countries: namely, that it tends to depict its attributes as neutral and rep-
resentative of all citizens regardless of their ideology, while accusing the 
minority group’s symbols and attitudes of division and partisanship. This 
fact stems from the idea that the majority group describes its attachment to 
the state as a form of non-nationalistic patriotism, the nationalists always 
being the others.112
The case under study has been Catalonia after the events of October 2017, 
when the local authorities decided to rename the commemorative streets 
about the Spanish constitution (city of Girona) and the monarchy (city of 
Sant Cugat del Vallès) by adding a new label in remembrance of the 2017 
pro-independence referendum. The cultural battle between the majority and 
the minority national communities is very explicit here, and thus provides 
scholars with an enticing opportunity to examine the behaviour of majority 
nationalism in this situation.
In this respect, the empirical findings largely meet the theoretical expecta-
tions. Although several surveys show that both the Spanish and the Catalan 
symbols under scrutiny do not generate a broad consensus, the representa-
tives of majority nationalism framed their own symbols as neutral and repre-
sentative of all citizens regardless of their ideology, while depicting the 2017 
secessionist referendum and the act of renaming the streets as partisan and 
deeply divisive. The role of the rule of law is also important since the other 
main frame activated to denounce secessionism is the illegality of the poll. 
Moreover, the local authorities were accused of radicalism and sectarianism 
for the renaming initiative. Overall, the spokespersons’ statements focused 
more on the criticism of the pro-independence side than on the defence of 
their own symbols. 
112. Billing, “Banal nationalism”; Dieckhoff, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Nationalism”.
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By performing a frame analysis of the speeches, media reports and records 
of that debate, three frames have been highlighted regarding the alleged 
neutrality of the state symbols, especially the constitution. On the one hand, 
coexistence, meaning that it ensures a proper level of social harmony because 
it represents all citizens and is a focal point for everyone. On the other hand, 
the parties under study stressed that this symbol follows the legitimate rule 
of law, thus identifying legality and official status with a neutral framework. 
Finally, the constitution has also been framed as the embodiment of democ-
racy and liberal values.
Two points are worth noting regarding this issue. First of all, the constitution 
in Girona is far more vindicated than the figure of the king in Sant Cugat 
del Vallès, which is barely mentioned. This fact is maybe due to the fact that 
the monarchy has a low level of support in Catalonia, even among non-seces-
sionist citizens, while the constitutionalist rhetoric of democracy and liberal 
values is very engaging for those who identify with the state. Secondly, there 
are strong differences between the political parties. The representatives of 
the Popular Party and Citizens present a harsh discourse against the pro-in-
dependence symbols and attitudes, while the spokespersons of the Socialist 
Party project a more nuanced speech and even tolerate the new pro-inde-
pendence label, but on the condition of maintaining the former one. In con-
trast with the PP and Cs, the Socialist Party in Catalonia has a more mixed 
national identity and is formally an independent branch of the Spanish PSOE.
Moreover, the Socialists in Girona made the case for maintaining the “consti-
tution square” on the grounds of the democratic transition rhetoric. The state 
symbols are upheld as accomplishments of that “epic journey to democracy”,113 
and the mainstream interpretation of history is seen as widely shared. It is 
known that collective memory gives continuity to national identity that uses 
stories passed down from generation to generation but, inevitably, memory 
ultimately becomes a production of political actors in the present and is used 
for political purposes.114 Here, the official narrative about the transition to 
democracy is invoked against the purposes of the pro-independence organ-
isations in rewriting the story.
113. Druliolle, Democracy Captured by its Imaginary.
114. Castiñeira, Imagined Nations.
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Nevertheless, the Popular Party and Citizens neither defended the consti-
tution nor attacked the pro-independence initiative on the same grounds. 
Although we could infer that the perception of the constitution as a tool 
which ensures coexistence stems from its mainstream interpretation rooted 
in the myth of 1978, this assumption is not as robust as the explicit statements 
made by the socialists. The second hypothesis of the research, which holds 
that the contemporary Spanish nationalist discourse has much to do with the 
vindication of the democratic transition, is accepted in our particular case 
but with less empirical evidence than the first hypothesis about the alleged 
neutrality of the state symbols.
To conclude, three original contributions have been made in this research. On 
the one hand, it has offered new empirical evidence to add to existing theo-
ries about majority nationalism. Particularly, concerning the majority group’s 
perception of the state symbols as neutral and representative of the whole 
citizenry, while the minority symbols are framed as partisan and divisive. On 
the other hand, it has provided significant although insufficient evidence re-
garding contemporary Spanish nationalism, which is argued to be rooted in 
the myth of the democratic transition, the 1978 constitution being its main 
symbol. Finally, the research enhances our understanding of a specific histor-
ical episode, namely, the 2017 pro-independence referendum in Catalonia and 
the battle for street naming in a context of national polarisation.
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Appendix: List of documents analysed
Title Date Source URL
Recullen signatures en contra 
del canvi de Plaça Constitució 










La Plaça de la Constitució de 
Girona es convertirà al febrer en 
“plaça de l’1 d’octubre”
19/01/2018 Diari de Girona https://www.diaridegirona.cat/giro-
na/2018/01/19/placa-constitucio-giro-
na-convertira-febrer/891065.html
Veray critica que “el govern de 
Girona s’ha intentat saltar el 
reglament del nomenclàtor que 
vam aprovar tots en el Ple de 
l’Ajuntament”





Veray reitera la seva “total 
oposició” a la proposta de canvi 
de nom de la Plaça Constitució 
per Plaça 1 d’Octubre




Veray reclama a Madrenas que 
“retiri de l’ordre del dia del Ple 
de dilluns la proposta de canvi 
de nom de la Plaça Constitució 
per Plaça 1-O”





Javier Cercas, Joan Manuel del 
Pozo i Jordi Canal s’afegeixen 
al manifest per la Plaça de la 
Constitució a Girona







Manifestación españolista en 
Girona
11/02/2018 El Nacional https://www.elnacional.cat/es/polit-
ica/manifestacion-espanolista-giro-
na_238017_102.html
Míriam Pujola: “el govern 
municipal no només ha canviat 
de nom una plaça, ha faltat el 
respecte a tots els que no pensen 
com ells”





Sessió ordinària de l’Ajuntament 
en Ple del 12 de febrer del 2018
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Title Date Source URL
El Partit Popular acusa a Mercè 
Conesa de “haberse convertido 
en adalid del independentismo 
más radical”
09/05/2018 Twitter https://twitter.com/PPSantCugat
Ciutadans (Cs) Sant Cugat 
arremete contra el gobierno 
del PDeCAT por el cambio de 
nombre de la “Plaça del Rei” por 
la “Plaça de l’1 d’Octubre”






Sant Cugat esborra el rastre 






“Tabarnia Lliure” secuestra la 
placa de l’1 d’octubre en Sant 
Cugat y pide un rescate
23/05/2018 Crónica Global https://cronicaglobal.elespanol.com/
politica/tabarnia-lliure-secuestra-placa-
1-o-sant-cugat_143465_102.html
Sessió ordinària de l’Ajuntament 
en Ple de l’11 de desembre de 
2017









Millo arremete contra la 
alcaldesa de Girona por llamar 
“plaza del 1 de octubre” a la 




Millo, sobre la plaça de l’1 
d’octubre: “hauria estat millor 
posar-li Marta Madrenas ja que 






Millo lleva a la abogacía del 
estado la placa de la plaza del 
1-O de Girona
25/04/2018 El Periódico https://www.elperiodico.com/es/polit-
ica/20180425/millo-pide-informe-pla-
za-1-octubre-girona-abogacia-esta-
do-6783516 Table 6 - List of documents 
analysed.
